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(Innovation in the Age of the 4th Industrial Revolution)
Introduction1
The usual vocabulary of change is no longer adequate for describing the paradigmatic 
transformation in the capitalist development. Mazzucato (2020) stresses the trinity of 
the current crisis: we have to face not only with the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic 
and the resulting economic crisis but also with the long debated climate crisis. Besides 
this triple crisis of capitalism, it is worth calling attention to another revolutionary 
change: the shift in the techno-economic paradigm.2 In this relation, the following 
two major technological breakthroughs could be distinguished. The first one is the 4th 
industrial revolution driven by the digitisation/automation/robotisation and artificial 
intelligence (AI). Industry 4.0 as a terminology represents “a vision of increasing 
digitisation of production. The concept describes how the so-called Internet of Things 
(IoT), data and services will be a change in the future production, logistics and work 
processes […]. They are alluding to a new organisation and steering of the entire value 
chain, which is increasingly becoming aligned with individual customer demands”.3 
The second technological breakthrough is the platform-based business model of cap-
italism. Unfortunately, a generally accepted terminology of this digitally based plat-
form economy – in spite of the fast growing literature – is still missing. Among the 
great number of definitions, we prefer to use the concept of platform, according to 
which platforms “…operate as “match-makers” between previously fragmented and 
unconnected groups of users. In the course of pervasive digitisation, platforms have 
fundamentally transformed domains as diverse as the market for goods (e.g. Ama-
zon, eBay), mobility (e.g. Uber, Lyft), labour (e.g. Upwork, TaskRabbit), funding (e.g. 
Kickstarter, Prosper) and of course, the entire field of online search, socialising and 
content production (e.g. Facebook, Google, YouTube)”.4
1 The authors would like to express their appreciation for the helpful participation of Katalin Bácsi, 
Budapest Corvinus University, in the first version of this paper.
2 Perez 2010.
3 Buhr 2015, 4. It is worth mentioning, that the term Industry 4.0 was not an academic invention but first 
systematically used by a working group chaired by the Rober Bosch Gmbh; Acatech aimed to work on 
Industry 4.0 even before the terminology Industry 4.0 was introduced at the well-known Hannover Fair 
in 2011 (Kopp et al. 2016).
4 Grabher–Tuijl 2020, 4.
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This paper intends to describe the impacts of the second strand of technological trans-
formation (i.e. platform economy) – often called the Uberisation of economy – in terms 
of job structure, working conditions, employment status and collective voice of platform 
workers. The core text is based on the review of both academic and grey literature on 
platform work and lessons drawn from the preliminary fieldwork (i.e. interviews with 
trade unionists, leaders of platform owners, researchers, blog writers and other experts) 
carried out in Hungary.
In relation with the development of platform technology, we share the following per-
spective that insists: “Technologies – the cloud, big data, algorithms and platform – will 
not dictate our future. How we deploy and use these technologies will. When we look 
at the history of innovations such as electric utility grids, call centres and the adoption 
of technology standards, we find that the market and social outcomes of using new 
technologies vary across countries. Once we start on a technology path, it frames our 
choices, but the technology does not determine in the first place exactly which trajectory 
we will follow.”5
The structure of this paper follows the guideline elaborated by the EU funded 
CrowdWork216 international research consortium. The first section gives an overview 
on the scientific debates about the digital platform workers. Results of the European 
survey – including Hungary – are outlined in the next section. The third section describes 
the main features of the national debate in Hungary based on a variety of sources (e.g. 
national media, web search, blogs, etc.). The fourth section intends to identify the posi-
tion of social actors on the practice of platform work. In this section, the authors are 
using the Uber story as a lens to illustrate the social-economic and legal challenges for 
the social actors and institutions. The concluding section summarises the main lessons 
of the analysis.
Platform work and its institutional filters
Before presenting in detail the public and scientific debate about digital platform workers 
in Hungary, it is worth briefly describing the main features of the Hungarian industrial 
relations system as well as the state-of-the-art of the international scientific debate about 
platform work in general. These two issues represent the most important contextual 
factors and therefore are necessary to be briefly summarised in order to interpret in an 
adequate way what is happening in the country in this particular field. The project aims 
to understand the multiform strategies of stakeholders, (trade unions, employers’ asso-
ciation, governments, self-organised platform workers’ organisations) and this cannot 
be achieved without a deeper understanding of the varieties of the national systems of 
industrial relations.
5 Kenney–Zysman 2016, 14.
6 Source: https://crowd-work.eu/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
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Platform work: Lack of consent-based terminology and the heterogeneous  
character of platform work
The digital platform work is a new coordination form of economic activities where 
transactions between the partners involved are carried out through a digital platform. 
According to Mateescu and Nguyen, its main features are the followings:
– “Prolific data collection and surveillance of workers through technology
– Real-time responsiveness to data that informs management decision
– Automated or semi-automated decision-making
– Transfer of performance evaluation to rating systems or other metrics, and
– The use of “nudges” and penalties to indirectly incentivise workers behaviours”7
The comparison of the results of different empirical research in the field is often hin-
dered by the lack of the harmonious use of terminology on digital labour and by the 
insufficiently systematic and uncoordinated data collection. This ‘knowledge deficiency’ 
syndrome makes cross-country comparison of platforms difficult, as well as inquiry into 
concerted policy actions on both national and EU level public governance that are aimed 
at regulating the online labour market. The source of the lack of consent is not due to 
the shortage of definitions but rather a plethora of terminology. Sedláková, for instance, 
identified the following terms most often used to describe platform work: crowdsourcing, 
sharing economy, collaborative economy, collaborative consumption, share economy, 
click-work, on demand economy, crowdworker, platform work, crowdwork, platform 
economy, gig work, platform labour.8
In a similar vein, Heeks (2017) made a systematic analysis of the literature on digital 
labour and found nearly 30 different terms to describe the intersection between work, 
connectivity and digital technologies. Based on a literature review, he suggested using 
the following “prime terms”.
Table 1: Terms used and the implied differences in their focus
Main focal point Prime terms to be used
Work (labour) Online labour, crowdwork, digital labour, microwork
Clients Online outsourcing, microsourcing
Overall domain Gig economy, platform economy
Source: Compiled by the authors based on Heeks 2017, 2.
In this respect, it is worth citing the definition of Eurofound as the largest labour research 
institute in Europe, coordinating multiple European wide surveys and case study research 
in the field of work and employment. Eurofound suggests the following definitions of 
digital platform work: “Platform work is a form of employment that uses an online plat-
7 Mateescu–Nguyen 2019, 3.
8 Sedláková 2018, 6.
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form to enable organisations or individuals to access other organisations or individuals to 
solve problems or to provide services in exchange for payment. The main characteristics 
of platform work are the following:
– Paid work is organised through an online platform.
– Three parties are involved: the online platform, the client and the worker.
– The aim is to carry out specific tasks or solve specific problems.
– The work is outsourced or contracted out.
– Jobs are broken down into tasks.
– Services are provided on demand”.9
The CrowdWork research consortium plans to focus on work and labour in the perspective 
of finding new strategies to organise labour in Europe.10 With this orientation in mind, 
we intend to recommend the simultaneous use of online digital labour or platform work 
together with the indication of the platform, which permit identification of the variety of 
professional profiles of the participants on the digital labour market. As concerning the 
varieties of platform workers, another important outcome of our literature review is the 
fact that the use of such “umbrella terms” as crowdwork, platform work, gig work, etc. 
hides important differences among these types of employees in terms of skill require-
ments, wages and other dimensions of working conditions.
Pongratz (2018) further distinguishes three types of platform work according to their 
core characteristics as the average skill level of the tasks performed, the average wage 
level, and how they address their online workers, themselves and their client companies. 
This is summarised in the following table.
Table 2: The main types and semantics of various platforms
Microtask Freelance platforms Specialised platforms
Task complexity Low High High
Payment Low-paid Higher wages Higher wages
Workers are addressed As workers As freelancers As freelancers
Jobs are labelled Task Project
Varies according to the 
purpose (design, translation, 
etc.)
Platform designation Platform or marketplace Platform or marketplace Platform or marketplace
Buyers are called Customers, clients, buyers Customers, clients, buyers Customers, clients, buyers
Source: Compiled by the authors based on Pongratz 2018, 63–64.
Furthermore, we can distinguish between platforms that are about mediating physical 
services and require personal presence (e.g. Uber, Babysitter.hu, Airbnb, Delivero, Bolt, 
etc.) from those involving an intermediary between digital services fulfilled without 
personal presence (e.g. Upwork, Guru, Cloud Factory, Amazon Mechanical Turk etc.). 
9 Eurofound 2018a, 9.
10 The Project title: Crowdwork – Finding new strategies to organise labour in Europe (CrowdWork21), 
Call for proposal: VP/2018/004 Improving expertise in the field of industrial relations.
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To put it in a more formalised way, Pajarinen et al. (2018) classified 2 different types of 
platform workers: “(a) Online Labour Markets (OLMs), in which an outcome of a job 
task is electronically transmittable; and (b) Mobile Labour Markets (MLMs), in which 
the delivery of a service requires personal presence.”11 We can further add that platform 
work of both OLM and MLM can belong to the category of ‘low-skilled and low-paid’ 
as well as ‘high-skilled and high-paid’ jobs as presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Types of labour markets and platform work: Low vs. high-skilled work
Types of the labour market Micro work(low-skilled – low-paid)
Specialised work (medium 





Online Labour Market 
(OLM)
Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(AMT)





(MLN) Uber, Taxify, Bolt
UrbanSitter, Medicast (MD 
house calls)
Source: Compiled by the authors based on Pajarinen et al. 2018, 5; Pongratz 2018, 72–73.
As Pongratz (2018) rightly stresses: “The choice of terminology by different types of plat-
forms is neither random nor arbitrary. The term ‘worker’ emphasises the mere status 
of being employed and evokes associations of routine tasks and tough working condi-
tions. ‘Freelancer’ on the other hand, stresses the independence and responsibility of 
self-employment, including prospect of demanding jobs and reasonable income. Thus, 
they refer deliberately to the established discourses of work and employment in order to 
arouse interest among target groups with suitable skills and ambitions.”12
Using such characteristics of job quality (JQ) as wages, education and training, work-
ing conditions, employment quality, work life balance, etc., we may avoid the oversim-
plification in such inexact terminology as ‘crowdworker’ and thus avoid the possible 
misinterpretation of the research outcomes. Semiotic analysis of the 44 global English 
language platforms calls attention to “…the diversity of the occupational groups involved 
[…]. It impedes any attempt to find an overarching category for all online works as no 
one category is widely used across all types of platforms.”13
During the desktop research, we analysed the data available on one of the most pop-
ular platform company website (Upwork) and found substantially differing jobs. On the 
Upwork freelance platform, the following professionals were represented:
– Software developers, web designers
– IT and networking professionals
– Data scientists and analytics expert
– Engineers
11 Pajarinen et al. 2018, 5. It is worthy of note that the authors distinguish short-term work assignment as 
an additional essential characteristic of platform work.
12 Pongratz 2018, 64.
13 Pongratz 2018, 64.
270
Csaba Makó – Miklós Illéssy




Table 4 illustrates the professional profiles of the Upwork platform in the CrowdWork21 
research consortium countries. Among the countries, Germany has the leading role, 
followed by Spain, Portugal and finally Hungary. The difference between the frontrun-
ner Germany, Spain and the trailing edge Hungary is more than double regarding the 
aggregate number of the Upworkers. The most populated professions are as follows: 
translation, writing and software development and web design. These professions are 
the most populated in the leading edge countries (Germany and Spain). However, in 
the trailing edge countries (Portugal and Hungary), the differences are less sharp in the 
case of “IT and Networking” (Portugal: 355 – Hungary: 345) and “Data Science and 
Analytics” (Portugal: 255 – Hungary: 245).






















Hungary 4,891 1,235 345 245 332 1,304 493 1,304 17
Germany 13,489 3,206 706 730 594 3,381 2,214 4,307 45
Portugal 7,565 1,518 355 255 425 2,111 1,266 3,000 27
Spain 12,200 2,150 524 420 574 3,375 2,075 4,447 58
Source: Hungarian National Research Team, Nasib Jafarow owns calculation based on Upwork.com as 
of 4 April 2019.
Institutional filters: Erosion of the Hungarian Industrial Relations System (IRS)14
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) and employment regimes in Europe. National systems of 
industrial relations are just as diverse as the platform workers are, so it is worth taking a short 
overview on this topic. Technological changes may have different social and economic impacts 
in different countries according to the country-specific institutional arrangements. These 
key regulatory institutions – such as education and training, labour market regulation and 
industrial relations systems, welfare regimes, tax systems, etc. – play a crucial filtering role 
in shaping the national effects of even such mega-trends as the emerging and rapidly grow-
ing practice of platform work. It is also obvious that the intensity and the ‘quality’ of public 
discourse on platform work are also conditioned by these institutional filters to a great extent.
14 For the sake of clarity, we will use the term industrial relations and labour relations as synonyms.
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Institutions have been in the focus of social sciences from the beginning of their 
history, but the most current wave on institutional diversity can be traced back to the 
seminal work of Hall and Soskice (2001) on variety of capitalism (VoC). They called 
attention to the important interactions that exist between employment and working 
practices and the differences in the national systems of education and training, labour 
relations, labour market polices, etc. They identified three major institutional clusters 
of capitalism: liberal market economy (LME), coordinated market economy (CME) and 
Mediterranean economy. Presently, the VoC approach is one of the cornerstones of the 
evolutionary theory of economics. The binary model of the typology of capitalism was 
challenged – among others by Andre Sapir who distinguished four types of European 
social models. (It should be noted that an obvious disadvantage of the binary model is that 
not all countries easily fit into one of the two categories.) Sapir’s model is based on two 
axes of a welfare system: efficiency and equity. For the sake of brevity, we only present 
the classification of countries along the four types of social models proposed by Sapir.




High ‘Continental’(AT, BE, DE, FR, LU)
‘Nordic’
(DK, FI, NL, SE)
Low ‘Mediterranean’(ES, GR, IT, PT)
‘Anglo-Saxon’
(IE, UK)
Source: Sapir 2005, 9.
However, the VoC school of evolutionary economics produced less developed compar-
ative knowledge on the institutional variety of the capitalist development among the 
post-socialist countries, mainly due to the historically short experiences of capitalism 
in these countries. Fortunately, there have been notable efforts recently aimed to over-
come this knowledge deficiency by applying the VoC approach for the CEE countries, 
too: Morawski (2019), Makó and Illéssy (2016), Bohle and Greskovits (2012), Szelényi 
and Wilk (2011) and Martin (2008). From among these and other attempts, the theory 
of employment regimes developed by Duncan Gallie is worthy of note in the context of 
the CrowdWork project.
Roughly speaking, the employment regime theory extends the analysis of VoC in the 
perspective of production regime theories by bringing in the characteristics of employ-
ment relationship, employment policy and industrial relations system. In contrast to the 
previous typologies, Gallie distinguished 3 types of employment regimes within the Euro-
pean economies. Inclusive employment regimes aim to increase the level of employment 
and at the same time the employees’ rights as much as possible. Dualist employment 
regimes guarantee extended rights for the core employees, while peripheral employees 
have much reduced workers’ rights and job security. In the market-based employment 
regimes, state intervention remains at the lowest possible level, labour regulation is weak, 
but market relations usually leads to higher levels of employment.
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European IRS institutions: Visible cross-country differences
This section briefly presents one of the most recent attempts aimed at classifying the 
varieties of industrial or labour relations systems in Europe. The Industrial Relations 
System (IRS) represents: “…collective relationships between workers, employers and 
their respective representatives, including the tripartite dimension where public authori-
ties at different levels are involved. Social dialogue refers to all communications between 
social partners and government representatives, from simple information exchanges to 
negotiations. Social partners are employees’ organisations (such as trade unions) as well 
as employers’ organisations.”15
An industrial relations system is an interaction between autonomous actors; neverthe-
less, it evolves in time. It results in a complex situation in case of post-socialist countries 
as the trade unions, with the exception of the Polish Solidarnosc, were not autonomous 
institutions at all during the socialist political regime when state party dominated all 
area of civil life, and the role of trade unions was reduced to be a ‘transmission belt’ 
aimed at mediating the will of the state party towards the rank-and-file employees and 
the management. In the following table we present the classification of the EU Member 
States according to different employment regimes.




























Source: Gallie 2011, 11.
It is not at all surprising, therefore, that after the collapse of state-socialist systems 
the trade union density rates16 fell dramatically in all countries of the region as their 
role and credibility had been compromised by this “forced coalition” with the mono-
party state. This general decline has been continuing ever since. According to the 
OECD data, this declining trend is not specific for any political regime since the 
vast majority of the Member States show the same pattern, as it can be seen from the 
following table.
15 Akgüc et al. 2018, 3.
16 Here we define trade union density rate as the proportion of trade union members compared to the total 
number of wage and salary earners.
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Table 7: Union density rates in Europe (%)
Year 1998 2003 2008 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Country
Austria 38 35 30 28 28 28 27 27 
Belgium 55 54 54 55 55 54 54 ..
Czech 
Republic 32 22 17 15 14 13 12 ..
Denmark 75 71 66 67 67 66 65 ..
Estonia 17 12 7 7 .. .. .. ..
Finland 78 73 69 67 66 67 .. 65 
France 8 8 8 8 8 8 .. ..
Germany 26 23 19 18 18 18 18 17 
Greece 27 .. 24 22 22 .. .. ..
Hungary 27 18 14 12 .. 11 .. 11y 
Ireland 41 35 31 34 33 .. .. ..
Italy 35 33 33 36 37 36 36 ..
Latvia .. 21 15 13 .. .. .. ..
Lithuania .. 14 9 9 8 8 8 8 
Luxembourg 43 43 37 35 .. 34 .. ..
Netherlands 24 21 19 19 18 18 18 17 
Poland 20 19 15 13 13 12 .. ..
Portugal 23 21 21 19 .. 17 16 16x 
Slovak 
Republic 36 26 17 14 13 12 11 ..
Slovenia 43 44 27 22 21 .. .. ..
Spain 19 16 17 17 17 16 14 14x 
Sweden 82 76 69 67 .. .. 67 ..
United 
Kingdom 30 29 27 26 25 .. .. ..
Source: Data extracted on 10 October 2019 07:15 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.
Legend:.. means no data available; x means data is from 2015; y means data is from 2014.
As we can see from Table 7, there is no country in Europe where the union density 
rate would increase between 1998 and 2016. There are some countries, like Belgium 
from the upper end and Italy from the middle segment of the density scale, where it has 
remained relatively stable, and those countries with the highest rates in 1998 experienced 
less significant decrease. In contrast, the most spectacular decline was observable in 
the post-socialist countries where union density rates generally trend downward since. 
Another important indice that is frequently used to describe industrial relations system is 
the collective bargaining coverage rate,17 so it is worth taking a look at this indicator, too.
17 The definition of collective bargaining coverage is the share of employees covered by a collective agre-
ement compared to the total number of wage and salary earners.
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Table 8: Collective bargaining coverage rates in European countries18
Year 2000 2005 2010 2015
Country     
Austria 98.00 98.00 98.00 98.00 
Belgium 96.00 .. 96.00 96.00 
Czech Republic 47.95 41.63 51.06 46.27 
Denmark 85.00 85.00 83.00 84.00 
Estonia .. 28.00 24.00 18.60 
Finland 85.00 87.70 77.81 89.32 
France .. 96.08 98.00 98.46 
Germany 67.75 64.90 59.76 56.80 
Greece 82.00 82.00 64.00 ..
Hungary 42.42 24.75 27.33 22.80 
Ireland 44.22 41.73 40.49 33.52 
Italy 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 
Latvia .. 15.00 20.36 14.85 
Lithuania .. 10.73 11.14 7.05 
Luxembourg 60.00 58.00 54.22 55.00 
Netherlands 81.70 86.83 89.65 79.41 
Poland 25.00 .. 14.86 ..
Portugal 78.43 83.20 76.74 72.26 
Slovak Republic 51.00 40.00 35.00 24.40 
Slovenia 100.00 100.00 80.00 65.00 
Spain 82.87 76.01 76.94 76.93 
Sweden 94.00 94.00 88.00 90.00 
United Kingdom 36.40 34.90 30.90 27.90 
Source: Data extracted on 10 October 2019 08:45 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.
Note: The OECD uses adjusted collective bargaining coverage rate, which means that 
the share of covered employees is compared not to all employees but only to those that 
have bargaining rights.
One of the most striking observations is that the differences between Old and New 
Member States are much higher in case of collective bargaining coverage rate compared 
to the union density. Collective bargaining is an important institution of social dialogue 
18 It is more difficult to collect this type of data; therefore, in missing cases we used the next data available. 
To be more accurate, for example, in case of Hungary we used the data from 1999 instead 2000, which was 
missing. Further ‘adjustments’ are as follows: for Denmark, Estonia, France and Slovakia we used data 
from 2004 to replace the missing data from 2005. For the similar year, we used data from 2006 in case of 
Lithuania. For 2010, we used data from 2008 in case of Belgium, data from 2009 for Estonia, France and 
Ireland, and data from 2011 in case of Luxemburg, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden, and for 2015, we used 
data from 2014 in case of France, Hungary, Ireland and Luxemburg.
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that can counterweight the declining trend of unionisation rate, at least for the employees 
having bargaining rights. For the sake of simplicity, we compare the latest available data 
from 2015. In all countries, except for Lithuania, the collective bargaining coverage rate 
is higher than the union density rate, the difference being significant in most of the cases. 
For example, in Austria the unionisation rate is 27%, which is paired with a collective 
bargaining coverage rate of 98%. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the Neth-
erlands where low unionisation rate (18%) is combined with a coverage rate of almost 
80%. The following table summarises this compensation effect.
Table 9: Compensation effect of collective bargaining coverage rate


























Source: Compiled by the authors based on OECD Statistics.
There is obviously no country where the low collective bargaining coverage rate would 
be combined with low union density rate but as we can see from the data, the leverage 
or compensation effect does not prevail in all countries at the same extent. In case of the 
Netherlands, Austria, France, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, the difference between the 
two rates are the highest, while in case of Italy, the medium level of unionisation rate is 
paired with a high level of collective bargaining coverage. It is obvious that the coverage 
rate is high in Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Sweden as the highest density rates are 
found in these countries as well. This leverage effect occurs in the Czech Republic and 
Germany but to a lesser degree since these two countries can be characterised by a low 
level of union density rate and medium level of collective bargaining coverage rate. There 
is no such compensation effect in case of Ireland and Luxemburg, where both rates are 
at medium level. The country group in the least advantageous position in this regard 
is composed by the U.K. and the vast majority of the post-socialist countries (Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia), where both rates are the 
lowest. These results are not surprising as these are the countries where the extension 
of multi-employer or sectoral level collective bargaining agreements has the weakest 
tradition.
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What is more surprising, however, is that a more detailed analysis of the interplay 
between the collective bargaining coverage rate and organisational density of social 
partners on both the employees’ and the employers’ side shows that this leverage effect 
is due to the higher unionisation rate mostly in the Nordic countries, where trade unions 
are more organised than employers’ association. In contrast: “In continental western and 
southern Europe, coverage rates are two to three times higher than the union density rate 
and much more driven by high rates of employer organisation and the legal extension 
of collective agreements to nonorganised firms by the state.”19 At the other extreme of 
the scale, we find primarily Central and Eastern European Countries, where both trade 
unions and employers’ associations are weakly organised, and collective agreements are 
more sparsely extended, even if the labour regulation allows this practice.
Inspired by Visser’s industrial relations regimes approach,20 a recent Eurofound study 
tried to establish a similar typology based on more recent data.21 The cluster analysis is 
built upon indicators covering four dimensions of industrial relations:
– Associational governance, which is aimed at characterising the relationship between 
governmental bodies and social partners (e.g. involvement of social partners in gov-
ernment decision on employment and economic policy, mechanisms for collective 
bargaining agreement extension, employer organisation density, coordination and 
main locus of collective bargaining, etc.).
– Representation and participation rights, including three variables measuring the 
strength of indirect participation at company level and representation rights at board 
level (board-level employee representation rights, Works Councils’ rights, status of 
works councils).
– Social dialogue at company level, including employee representation coverage, inci-
dence of information provided to the employee representation body by management, 
influence of employee representation in workplace-level decision-making, share of 
companies holding regular meetings where employees can directly express their 
views about the organisation.
– Strengths of trade unions and government intervention in industrial relations, includ-
ing unionisation rate and government intervention in collective bargaining and the 
setting of minimum wage.
The typology based on the cluster analysis distinguishes six types of industrial relations 
regimes, the first being the social partnership, which can be characterised by a high level 
of collective bargaining coverage rate. However, this is not due to strong unions but rather 
to highly organised employers’ association and strong intervention of the state in the 
coordination of collective bargaining, in wage-setting mechanisms. Besides, as the study 
notes: “At company level, this cluster includes some of the countries that have granted the 
19 Visser 2009, 51.
20 Visser 2009, 49.
21 Eurofound 2018b.
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most extensive legal rights to works councils (Austria and the Netherlands) and the most 
extensive board-level employee representation rights (Belgium is an exception to this).”22
The second cluster is the so-called ‘organised corporatism’ regime, the group of 
countries with high collective bargaining coverage based on highly coordinated and 
centralised collective bargaining and strong decentralised coordination structures: “A 
key defining feature of this cluster is the positive combination of collective autonomy 
and high associational governance (i.e. high collective bargaining coverage). It includes 
countries that provide extensive rights to works councils, particularly Germany and 
Sweden, where co-determination rights are established by law. It is also worth noting 
that national and sectoral collective agreements in the Nordic countries provide higher 
standards for information sharing and consultation than legal provisions.”23
The third cluster is the state-centred model, which is characterised by high collective 
bargaining coverage rate (although somewhat lower than in the case of the previous two 
clusters) and a weak social dialogue at company level. This is the result of a unique insti-
tutional arrangement in which “centralised but quite uncoordinated collective bargaining 
institutions that have greater dependence on state regulation. Indeed, this cluster records 
the highest scores in collective bargaining state intervention, which are matched by low 
trade union densities. While mandatory works councils exist at company level, they are 
granted less wide-ranging legal.”24
The fourth cluster is characterised by “company-centred governance” where union-
isation rate is low, collective and wage bargaining is decentralised and uncoordinated. 
The role of the state is residual and mostly limited to the set-up of the national minimum 
wage and to a relatively extended right of works councils guaranteed by the labour legis-
lation. “[A] defining feature of this cluster is its comparatively high performance in the 
industrial democracy sub-dimension of representation and participation rights at company 
level, which is higher than the southern cluster and close to the Nordic one. This is due to 
the existence of far-reaching rights provided to works councils/employee representative 
bodies, and some of the highest board-level employee representation rights in the EU.”25
The fifth cluster of ‘voluntarist associational governance’ is similar to cluster 4 and 
6 in terms of the uncoordinated and decentralised collective bargaining system but the 
coverage rate is somewhat higher. While differences are higher when it comes to com-
pany level collective bargaining, this cluster records the lowest score in the industrial 
democracy sub-dimension of representation and participation rights at company level. 
Countries have the voluntary character of the liberal system of employee participation in 
common, in which works councils or employee representative bodies are voluntary (even 
where these are mandated by law, and there are no legal sanctions for non-observance). 
Moreover, board-level employee representation rights are not available in most of the 
22 Eurofound 2018b, 37.
23 Eurofound 2018b, 38.
24 Eurofound 2018b, 39.
25 Eurofound 2018b, 40.
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countries under this cluster. Social dialogue performance at company level is compar-
atively low, although higher than in Cluster 3.26 Contrary to cluster 4 and 6, employers’ 
associations are strong.
The sixth cluster is the most market-oriented, with weak social partners and more gen-
erally the worst values for the variables in the associational governance27 sub-dimension. 
The uncoordinated and decentralised collective bargaining system is combined with the 
weak role of state intervention. Despite these differences, the last three country groups 
show significant similarities with low level of collective bargaining coverage and weak 
trade unions. As the study notes: “A clear division between two main groups: the Nordic 
and continental countries, which record the best scores in industrial democracy, and the 
southern, liberal and central and eastern-European (CEE) countries, which perform far 
worse in this dimension. A more detailed typology enables six clusters to be distinguished 
that show a high degree of stability between the two periods analysed.”28 The following 
table presents the composition of the different clusters.
Table 10: The industrial relations cluster in Europe
No. Characteristic Countries
1. Social partnership Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
2. Organised corporatism Germany, Denmark, Finland and Sweden
3. State-centred associational governance France, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain (and Greece for 2008–2012)
4. Company-centred governance Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia
5. Voluntarist associational governance Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania (and Greece for 2013–2017)
6. Market-oriented governance Estonia, Poland and the U.K.
Source: Eurofound 2018, 37.
The country-specific institutional arrangements are partly the heritage of the past, partly 
the result of the global financial crisis and economic downturn in 2008, after which severe 
deregulation took place in the field of industrial relations in many countries. In relation 
with the former, it is necessary to mention the effect of the collapse of the state-social-
ist political-economics system at end of 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. This 
political-economic regime termination was followed – with slight variations in the CEE 
countries – with the mass privatisation and fast restructuring of the national economies. 
For example, the dominance of large state-owned companies in socialism was replaced 
26 Eurofound 2018b, 40.
27 Associational governance means in this context that the government relies heavily on tripartite con-
sultation bodies and other forms of social dialogue when it comes to decision-making processes. In the 
industrial relations index, it is measured by the following five indicators: 1. union density rate; 2. employer 
organisation density; 3. institutionalised bipartite consultation bodies; 4. collective bargaining coverage; 
5. Routine involvement of unions and employers in government decisions on social and economic policy 
(Eurofound 2018b, 20).
28 Eurofound 2018b, 36.
279
Platform Work in Hungary: A Preliminary Overview
by the dominance of the micro firms and the SME sector. This disruptive change in 
the size-structure in the economy speeded up the decline of trade unions and the IRS 
through dismantling the previous regulatory and institutional framework of the economy 
and society (e.g. monolithic political architecture, transmission role of the trade unions 
between the ruling party and the economic management of the national economy, etc.) 
The loosing influence of the IRS resulted in not only the decline in interest representation 
of the wage earners in general but also contributed to the weakening of public control on 
the privatisation. Social partners had difficulties to influence the shares and distribution 
of winners and losers of the radical changes in ownership and governance structure of the 
economy and society in Hungary. The outcomes of this transformation process resulted 
in the weakening bargaining positions of the trade unions in the CEE region.
The majority of the post-socialist countries were also hit by the deregulative labour 
market “reforms” as a result of an external pressure of either the Troika29 or the coun-
try-specific recommendations of the so-called European Semester. However, it is inter-
esting to note that Hungary was a rather unique exception, where “policies undermining 
industrial democracy have been approved in the absence of external pressure. Since 
2010, the Hungarian Parliament has approved radical reforms that have restricted strike 
and trade union rights, and allowed collective agreements and individual employment 
contracts to deviate from labour law”.30
This striking example of “voluntary austerity” can only be understood if we take 
a closer look at the most recent changes in the Hungarian economic policy and politics. 
It dates back to the 2010 elections when Viktor Orbán won and achieved a supermajority 
in the Hungarian Parliament. We can observe a rather sharp regime change affecting all 
important areas of the social, economic and legal institutional arrangement. Neumann 
and Tóth describe the nature of these changes as “a statist and nationalist economic-pol-
icy turn and a shift from welfare to a workfare-based social policy”.31 This policy turn 
consists of neoliberal measures that aim to massively deregulate the labour market and to 
cut back welfare and wage expenditure in order to maintain some sort of competitiveness 
of the country,32 combined with large-scale economic and regulatory expansion of the 
state in the name of economic nationalism.33
Hungarian trade unions had been fragmented and politically divided, lacking the nec-
essary resources, constantly loosing support and trust from some of the employees so they 
were not prepared to counter-attack the measures of a government that had the support 
of two thirds of the MPs. Instead, they often focused on the interests of core employees 
29 Troika is a popular designation for the political decision-making group composed by the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
30 Eurofound 2018b, 9.
31 Neumann–Tóth 2018, 135.
32 This is the so-called low road of development based – among others – on low wages, medium-level 
skills, employer-friendly flexibility schemes and limited room for collective industrial action.
33 We have to note, however, that the boundaries between state, the governing party and the favoured 
interest groups (oligarchs) are blurred.
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at the expense of such peripherical employees as temporary agency workers.34 The char-
acteristics of this political turn are important in the context of the CrowdWork project 
as these measures further limit the opportunities for employees to express their voice.
Labour law regulation and platform work in Hungary35
In Hungarian labour law, platform workers are mostly independent contractors, as Hun-
gary does not have the third labour law category. Independent contractors are self-em-
ployed workers, whose work relationships are covered by the Civil Code (contract for 
service). The Civil Code does not provide any employment protection in the framework 
of such contracts for service, contrary to the Labour Code provisions on employment 
relationships.
The Hungarian labour law is unprepared to cope with the regulation of platform work. 
It is presently characterised by a rigid ‘binary model’ of employment regulation con-
sisting of employment contracts and civil law contracts: “universal” versus “zero” legal 
protection. In the perspective of the binary regulation, platform workers have either an 
“employee status” entitled to complete labour law protection guaranteed by the Labour 
Code (LC), or have the status of “self-employed” working without any legal protection 
under the scope of the Civil Code.
The Hungarian labour law does not regulate the third type of employment status: 
economically dependent worker or dependent contractor or worker. There is no special 
legal regulation on this third category of workers in the Labour Code. Moreover, it is 
impossible to use in a mechanistic way the legal regulations covering the standard (typi-
cal) and non-standard (atypical) employment relationships in the Labour Code. The major 
legislative issue is whether the regulation of the third employment status (economically 
dependent worker) would be an appropriate solution for the protection of platform (gig) 
workers. However, the third labour law status could only partly solve the particular 
problems created by gig work. Certainly, there are various issues related to platform 
work, which require rather particular legal solutions due to its special characteristics.
In this relation, one of the particular features of platform work is the rating system and 
its legal consequences. The Hungarian regulation is totally missing on “digital ratings”. 
Therefore, it is impossible to guarantee the transparency of online evaluation and to ques-
tion its correctness (i.e. legal remedy). Beyond transparency, the transferability of ratings 
is also a fundamental issue without legal guarantees. Online rating has two consequences: 
disciplinary sanctions or termination of the legal relationship (inactivation). According 
to the Labour Code, disciplinary sanctions may be levied if the collective agreement or 
the employment contract allows it.36 As a contrast, in civil law the parties may agree on 
34 Neumann–Tóth 2018, 145.
35 This section is based on the contributions of Dr. Tamás Gyulavári (labour lawyer, Department of Labour 
Law, Péter Pázmány Catholic University, Budapest) and Dr. Bankó Zoltán (labour lawyer, University of 
Pécs, Faculty of Law). The authors are grateful to them.
36 Act 1 of 2012 (Labour Code), Article 56(1).
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such legal consequences. In case of termination of employment (inactivation), platform 
workers usually lack any protection against termination due to the unilateral regulation 
of the employer (conditions of work on the website).
Furthermore, platform workers are not fully entitled to seemingly universal social 
rights, such as prohibition of child work and discrimination. In relation to child work, 
in principle the Labour Code provisions on the protection of young employees could be 
a satisfactory solution (i.e. in case of employees under 18, it is obligatory to apply the 
LC articles on the protection of young employees).37 Unfortunately, it is unclear whether 
the special rules on establishment of employment in relation to young employees (the 
age limit) shall be applied outside the employment contract. As for the equal treatment 
principle, the Equal Treatment Act (125 of 2003) shall be applied in all legal relationships 
aimed at work. Therefore, the nature of the work relationship is not relevant, since the 
equal treatment provisions must be applied in all circumstances.38
Collective rights and especially the right to conclude collective agreements are not 
ensured outside the scope of the Labour Code. In the Hungarian labour market, collective 
agreements exist almost exclusively at workplace level. Collective agreements may be 
concluded by a trade union (or their federation), if at least 10% of the employees are union 
members.39 However, if workers are lacking the employee status, they cannot be covered 
by a collective agreement. Works council agreements may provide an alternative or quasi 
collective agreement.40 In this case, a Works Council (WC) must be elected, but establish-
ment of a WC requires – again – the votes of employees (only). In this way, the “employee 
status” is the exclusive basis of employee rights, whether collective or individual.
Sector level collective agreements would be the ideal solution covering legal relations 
beyond employment relationships, covering also platform work. For instance, if a sector 
level collective agreement were operational on the entire personal transport sector, it 
would be possible to extend it over digital platforms providing taxi services. However, 
sector level collective agreements hardly exist in Hungary.41 While Act 74 of 2009 on 
sector level social dialogue regulated the role of sector level dialogue committees and 
middle level social dialogue, this Act only covers interest representation of employees.42 
In addition, the constraints of EU competition law regarding the conclusion of collective 
agreements by non-employees are present in Hungarian law, too.
As a consequence, the Hungarian labour law presently hardly addresses in any sub-
stantial way questions related to the protection of platform workers. Therefore, it would 
be necessary to create a separate and detailed legal regulation regarding workers outside 
the scope of employment relationships, with particular attention to platform workers.
37 Act 1 of 2012 (Labour Code), Article 4.
38 Act 125 of 2003, Article 5.d and 3(1)a–b.
39 Act 1 of 2012 (Labour Code), Article 276(1)–(2).
40 Act 1 of 2012 (Labour Code), Article 268.
41 Except the health sector. Source: www.aeek.hu/-/kollektiv-szerzodes-az-egeszsegugyben-unnepelyes-ala-
iras (Accessed: 21.09.2019.)
42 Act 74 of 2009, Article 1–2, 15(1).
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Lack of comprehensive empirical evidence on platform work:  
Hungarian experience in European perspective
Although the gig-economy as such is a popular topic in the international scientific 
debates, this topic is rather undervalued in the Hungarian context. This is even more 
true when it comes to platform workers, the discussion about their jobs’ content, working 
conditions and employment status, as well as their voice with management and collec-
tive bargaining power. This is partly because it is a rather new phenomenon, and partly 
because labour related issues are of secondary importance in the present practice of the 
Hungarian social sciences.
Therefore, international research projects represent the most important source of 
knowledge on platform work instead of the Hungarian ones. The first attempt to estimate 
the size of platform workers in 14 European countries has been made by the COLLEEM 
survey.43 The survey results are shown in the next table in a somewhat simplified version.

















Source: Pesole et al. 2019, 15 (COLLEEM dataset).
According to the estimates of the COLLEEM project, a non-negligent share of the Hun-
garian adult population (6.7%) makes some earnings from platform works. This ration 
is well below of the rates of such project partner countries as Spain (11.6%), Portugal 
(10.6%) or Germany (10.4%).
43 Pesole et al. 2019.
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Figure 1: Types of provided service by country (2017)
Source: Pesole et al. 2019, 35 (COLLEEM dataset).
Except for Lithuania, in all countries surveyed, the ‘digital service’ dominates. In relation 
with the CrowdWork21 research consortium countries, it is necessary to call attention 
to the leading roles of Spain, Portugal in comparison with Germany and especially 
with Hungary. The other interesting result of the survey: Nordic countries who have 
the highest level of “digital literacy” are among the “trailing edge” countries. As we 
mentioned earlier, the COLLEEM survey was the first attempt to map the quantitative 
and qualitative characteristics of platform workers in some selected European countries 
by using an empirical survey.
The IRSDACE (Industrial Relations and Social Dialogue in the Age of Collaborative 
Economy) project funded by the DG EMPL of the European Commission is another 
recent research project on platform work. Its aim is to explore new strategies of traditional 
stakeholders (trade unions, employers’ association, governmental bodies, etc.) towards 
the challenges of the collaborative economy. As part of the project, case studies were 
carried out about platform workers and platform companies in Hungary. This is the most 
recent and most comprehensive qualitative research in the country, therefore, we will 
briefly summarise its main results and findings.44
During the project, 13 interviews were made and additionally two focus group interviews 
were conducted with six platform workers. The sectors covered by the research were: 1. local 
personal transport; 2. housework; and 3. accommodation service. All three sectors belong to 
the category of mobile labour where personal presence is required for the service delivery. 
These three sectors differ greatly in terms of wages, skill level of the jobs, social status and 
interest representation. Baby-sitting works, for example, are regarded as the least desirable 
jobs, while those participating in the Airbnb business rarely consider themselves platform 
workers but rather entrepreneurs and real estate investors. Taxi drivers, in contrast, form 
a socio-professional group with traditionally string identity and collective representation.
44 For the whole report see Meszmann 2018.
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However, a rapid growth was observable in all three sectors during the last decades. 
This was due to the global financial crisis and the subsequent economic downturn that 
gave a rise for both the demand and the supply side of this special segment of the labour 
market through the increased cost sensitivity of households (demand side) and through 
the increased popularity of extra income generating service platforms (supply side). As 
the final research report concludes, the regulation of platform work is at the heart of 
the public debate while job quality and employees’ voice are not prioritised. Regulation 
is a tricky issue because all three sectors can be characterised by a high level of infor-
mality. Household work (baby-sitting) and other accommodation services (Airbnb) are 
minimally regulated, while the local personal transport sector is meticulously regulated.
This informality has a direct (negative) impact on the employment relations, as platform 
workers are usually self-employed or simply are not declared at all: “Such employment 
forms also do not provide solid ground for self-organization of labour. Those working 
in the platform economy typically do not have formal contracts and are thus deprived 
from enjoying rights stemming from employment contracts in addition to social rights. 
Micro-workers, or individual entrepreneurs, fulfil the criteria for membership with some 
civil and interest based associations, but do not fulfil the set criteria to become members 
affiliated with trade unions.”45 Most platform workers are typically either self-employed 
small entrepreneurs or registered natural persons working as service providers. This rep-
resents a further barrier to self-organisation of the workers as they are rarely entitled to 
join any existing trade union or create a new one. The social dialogue is even more cum-
bersome due to the fact that platform companies typically deny that they are employers 
of the platform workers but are serving only as an intermediary, bringing together buyers 
and sellers via an ICT platform. As concerning the buyers, it is worth noting that they are 
just as atomised individually as the workers are and have no social or economic interest to 
form any employer-type of collective entity. On the other hand, as employer organisations 
of the traditional (offline) subsectors have been vocal against platform companies, the most 
important emerging “battlefield” is not focused on the working conditions and job quality 
of platform workers but most often on fair competition and tax avoidance.
The general perception of the most relevant stakeholders on platform work are sum-
marised as follows: “Workers and service providers praised the efficiency of platforms to 
provide opportunities for earning income and, in some cases, job generation. Many high-
lighted the lack of introductory education regarding the risks and requirements of working 
for the platforms. On the other hand, traditional employers and service providers in local 
transport and accommodation expressed both caution and hostility towards the platform 
economy. This group highlighted unfair competition due to low regulation as causing 
undeclared employment and thus tax evading practices of the new competitors. Platform 
companies and platform based employers stressed the innovative and income generating 
dimension of their enterprise. Employers in the accommodation sector, and also small 
service providers using platforms for their service providing market, stressed the benefi-
45 Meszmann 2018, 5.
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cial, very different, personalized, detailed nature of services they delivered to customers. 
Finally, public authorities did not have a general stance towards platform companies.”46
Social dialogue is generally weak in Hungary, and consequently is even weaker 
when it comes to platform work. The social prestige of trade unions is low, Hungarian 
workers tend to consider themselves employees only if they have a full time employ-
ment contract. In addition, Hungarian trade unions do not prioritise highly platform 
workers as a potential recruitment base but take a more traditional approach. As men-
tioned previously, systemic efforts have been made from within the government that 
are aimed at weakening the role of the social dialogue at all levels. On the national 
level, the tripartite dialogue has been considerably limited in its scope and agenda, the 
power of the sectoral level social dialogue committees, established during the 2000s, 
has decreased to an even greater extent.47 It seems that there is a vicious cycle in the 
institutional framework of the interest representation in Hungary: the trade unions 
traditionally tend to represent the core workforce and leave precarious workers aside,48 
while employees tend to neglect the significance of trade unions and see them as an 
ineffective, old-fashioned and excrescent tool that can generally be ignored.
National debate reflected in the social media49
As the social science community has generally paid little attention to the social and 
economic consequences of platform work in Hungary, the same is true for public debate 
and for the traditional as well as online media. The majority of the articles written about 
platform work emphasises the advantages of platform work, while tends to understate 
the dark side of this form of work. There is also an interesting division between the 
mainstream media, which essentially ignores the topic, and some specialised blogs that 
are extensively focused on platform work.
For our analysis, web data on platform work were gathered and analysed. The figures 
presented below graphically represent where the discussion on sharing economy took place. 
According to the Hungarian keywords examined, the issue appeared most commonly in 
blogs (Figure 2). The majority of web links (HTML resources) are classified as blogs (more 
than 60%), which is followed by academia and media, both slightly above 10%. Websites of 
interest groups appeared in 5%, among them the appearance of traditional social partners 
(trade unions) was rare. The majority of the discussion is happening on unofficial fora, as 
blogs. Taking into consideration the PDF documents, these files are mostly published by 
the academia (approximately 40%), the interest groups are in the second place by approx-
imately 10%. In the ratio of sources, there is no significant change between 2018 and 2019.
46 Meszmann 2018, 37.
47 Meszmann 2018, 18.
48 Neumann–Tóth 2018, 144.
49 Some parts of this section are based on the contributions of Gergő Benedek who is a blog writer, owner 
of freelancer.hu. The classification of the web data (Figures 2 and 3) was made by Katalin Bácsi, Budapest 
Corvinus University.
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Figure 2: Classification of web data: HTML documents using native key terms
Source: Google search and own calculations. Key terms: közösségi gazdaság (sharing economy), 
platform gazdaság (platform economy), hakni gazdaság (gig economy), online gazdaság (online 
economy), digitális munka (digital labour).
The presence of debates on these topics is rare on television or radio, and only a few podcasts 
and news sources exist, and these are mainly connected to platforms of public transport 
(Lime, Mol Bubi). In magazines and newspapers, related articles are mainly connected to 
newly established platforms, to defining and usage of the sharing economy, and to what it 
means to be a freelancer. The blogs are primarily connected to platforms and freelancers.
Figure 3: Classification of web data: PDF documents using native key terms
Source: Google search and own calculations. Key terms: közösségi gazdaság (sharing economy), 
platform gazdaság (platform economy), hakni gazdaság (gig economy), online gazdaság (online 
economy), digitális munka (digital labour).
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The PDF documents are mainly connected to policy makers, focusing primarily on defi-
ning the sharing economy related to accommodation services and local transportation.
Interest representation (collective voice) and the platform work
Platform work is a marginal issue in the current Hungarian public and scientific discourse 
in comparison with such topics as the growing number of Hungarians working abroad 
and the subsequent labour shortage on the Hungarian labour market, and more recently 
the social and economic impact created by the COVID-19 pandemic.
In this context, it is not at all surprising that the debate about the precarious employ-
ment practices of platform work is not so intensive. As we will examine, the majority of 
the public debates around such pioneering platform companies as Uber and Airbnb is 
primarily about the economic regulation-related effects these new business models. It is, 
therefore, somewhat obvious that the traditional stakeholders (trade unions, employers’ 
associations) are less active in organising themselves around these topics, while new or 
grassroots interest representative associations have been slowly emerging. In the fol-
lowings, we will briefly summarise the stance of the most relevant stakeholders towards 
platform work through the lens of some of the few initiatives and actions that have been 
found during the desktop research and the preliminary fieldwork, interviewing selected 
groups of stakeholders.
Hungarian trade unions: Slow exploration of the new forms to organise platform workers50
Preliminary remarks: More European than national level initiatives. Digitalisation and 
platform working are new topics for the Hungarian trade unions and the confederations. 
While there are 6 confederations and more than 150 trade unions, the movement is very 
fragmented and weak. In this context, it is a hard work to disseminate new topics (e.g. 
working time reduction, gender questions, platform work), because of current pressing 
challenges: low salaries, employees’ unfriendly legislation (‘slavery law’ from 2018), low 
TU density, weaknesses of the collective bargaining power, poor working conditions in 
the public sector, etc. The Hungarian confederations are participating on the international 
trade union movement, and while the ETUC, the EPSU and other European organisations 
are involved and interested in the digitalisation and the platform working, the Hungarian 
trade unions are less open and active in the field of platform work than in other parts 
of Europe. A recent Eurofound study examined the newest or most innovative practices 
and found quite large varieties as to how the social partners address and deal with such 
50 This section is based on the contribution of János Véber, Deputy President of the Hungarian Union of 
Cultural Institutions and Public Collections Employees (KKDSZ) and Member of the Committee of Labour 
Market and Employment of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). The authors are grateful 
to him.
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new topics as for example platform work. The authors distinguished three main groups 
of countries that are shown in the following table.
Table 12: Social partners exploring new topics since 2000 – main results (2015)
Patterns of addressing new topics Countries exploring these patterns
Mainly shadowing EU-level developments and initiatives Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, U.K.
Exploring also additional topics Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia
Exploring new topics France, Luxembourg, Italy
With significant changes after 2008 Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain
Exploring a broad range of new topics Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands
Plus initiating organisational changes and labour market/
welfare reforms Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
Source: Eurofound 2016, 64.
As we can see from the table above, Hungarian social partners belong to the category 
of the least open and active countries in terms of addressing new issues emerging from 
such global trends like the growing number of platform workers. From the CrowdWork21 
research consortium countries, data show that social partners are more innovative in 
Portugal and Spain, especially since the global economic and financial crisis, while 
German social partners are traditionally good in exploring a broad range of new topics, 
although to a lesser extent than their Scandinavian counterparts. This was reinforced by 
our own preliminary research as well, where we found that trade union leaders admitted 
they lacked the financial and human (expert) resources and background to initiate com-
prehensive actions in that field. However, we found there are some initiatives at national 
and international level they have been involved in recently.
Selected EU trade union involved projects on digital economy: Weak involvement of 
the Hungarian trade unions51
International projects of ETUC (European Trade Union Council): Workers 
Participation – The Key to Fair Digitalisation (2016–2018)
www.etuc.org/en/key-fair-digitalisation
ETUC had a project entitled Workers’ Participation: The Key to Fair Digitalisation. This 
project examined practices responding to the key challenges and questions surrounding 
workers’ participation, considering the changes brought about by digitalisation. ETUC 
and ETUI organised conferences and seminars in this topic. ETUI published a research 
paper about the new challenges of digitalisation, which were based on an international sur-
51 The rare exception of the involvement of the National Association of Works Council (Munkástanácsok 
Szövetsége) in a recent, EU supported project on platform work (Kun–Rácz 2019).
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vey. The Hungarian Trade Unions and confederations were represented in the seminars, 
conferences. The published report on these events can be found on the following link:
www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/publication/file/2018-09/Voss%20Report%20EN2.pdf
As a part of this project, ETUC published the first report on platform economy (edited 
by Jeremiah Prassl):
www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/publication/file/2018-09/Prassl%20report%20maquette.pdf
Establishing workers representation and social dialogue 
 in the platform and app economy (2019–)
The last Conference of the ETUC (held in Vienna, May 2019) underlined the importance 
of the new ways of employment, e.g. digitalisation and platform working. In this light, 
ETUC in partnership with the French institute IRES and the organisation ASTRESS 
has started the project Establishing workers representation and social dialogue in the 
platform and app economy, funded by the European Commission. The project started 
in March 2019, with a two years duration and has three specific objectives: 1. setting 
up and running a European Observatory for the development of workers participation 
in digital platforms; 2. identifying and accompanying new and innovative practices 
that aim at improving representation, organisation and protection of platform workers 
(two collective coaching sessions are planned); and 3. proposing a European regulatory 
framework to establish worker representation in platforms and fair working conditions 
in these companies. The first meeting of the observers from the ETUC side was held on 
18 September, and while there was no representation from the Hungarian Trade Unions, 
they will be informed as the project continues.
National level initiatives: Domination of the information campaign domination –  
The Future of Work (2016)
The MASZSZ (The Hungarian Trade Union Confederation) and the FES (Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung) organised a conference in Budapest in 2016 on the topic: The Future of 
Work. Speakers, scientists and trade union leaders identified digitalisation and platform 
working as a key element of employment in the future:
http://szakszervezet.net/images/kepek/2017/11_november/A_munka-jovoje_
konferencia-Program-20161122.pdf
Report for the National Economic and Social Council of Hungary (2018)
Trade unions presented a working paper in the NGTT (The National Economic and 
Social Council), which is the highest level forum for social dialogue between the gov-
ernment, trade unions and employers’ association. The paper was prepared by a working 
group of Hungarian trade union confederations on the topic of digitalisation. This work-
ing paper was submitted in autumn 2018. The NGTT has discussed and accepted this 
information paper without any recommendations for the social partners of the NGTT.
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A grassroot initiative: When platform owners (operators) organise themselves –  
The case of the Hungarian Sharing Economy Association (HSEA)
One of the weakest points of the Hungarian industrial relation system is the weak organ-
isation of the employer’s side. This is due to multiple reasons, the most important one 
being the lack of interest and incentive to do so. This is not the case, however, in the field 
of platform work. Although trade unions are struggling with organising individualised 
platform workers, we already found the rudiment of a self-organising employers’ asso-
ciation. The term might be misleading as they do not define themselves as employers, 
so it would be more adequate to call them business groups; nevertheless, this is a rather 
unique initiative.
The Hungarian Sharing Economy Association was established in March 2017 to 
promote the development of sharing economy in Hungary. Their members strongly 
believe that exploiting the potential of sharing helps all the players in the economy to 
operate efficiently and sustainably.52 Currently they have 14 member organisations. 
Their main goals relative to platform work are as follows: 1. Support (to create a general 
framework for the functioning of the community economy representing the interest 
of businesses and consumers in every possible forum; 2. Knowledge Deepening (to 
increase understanding about the community economy, and promoting the aspirations 
of enterprises operating in the spirit of sharing economy); and 3. Influence Regulatory 
Framework (to promote the development of legal guidelines and tax regulations that 
are tailored for the functioning of community economic models and are ideal for all 
stakeholders).
The member organisations are recruited primarily from the person-to-person (P2P) 
markets and include both mobile labour market (MLM) and online labour market (OLM) 
companies (see section Platform work: Lack of consent-based terminology and the het-
erogeneous character of platform work of this report for a precise definition).
Platforms active on the mobile labour markets:
– Oszkár53 (Oscar), car sharing company for longer distance trips, mainly inland
– a Miutcank.hu54 (ourstreet.hu), a community building platform that aims at explor-
ing the hidden opportunities and resources of one’s neighbourhood, thus promoting 
sustainability
– Click4work,55 casual work for students
– Loffice,56 office, event space and coworking
– Boatly,57 boat renting
52 Source: www.sharingeconomy.hu/?lang=en (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
53 Source: www.oszkar.com/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
54 Source: https://miutcank.hu/hu.html (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
55 Source: https://clickforwork.hu/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
56 Source: https://budapest.lofficecoworking.com/about_us (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
57 Source: https://boatly.hu/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
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– Veddbérbe58 (takearent.hu), renting a broad range of tools (utensils, casual clothes, 
office instruments, vehicles, etc.)
– Dooroffice,59 event space and coworking
– Kaptár60 (Hive), community office
– Roomly,61 renting a premise
– Meló-diák,62 student work
Platform members active on the online labour markets (OLM):
– Tikething,63 ticket sales
– Barion,64 online payment
– Rukkola,65 online booksharing
– Tőkeportál,66 crowdfinance
The activities of the association cover three main areas:
1. Supporting: They help to create a general framework for the functioning of the 
community economy representing the interest of businesses and consumers in every 
possible forum.
2. Find answers: They support to deepen the knowledge about community economy and 
promote the aspirations of enterprises operating in the spirit of a sharing economy.
3. Shape regulation: their members agree to promote the development of legal guideli-
nes and tax regulations that are tailored for the functioning of community economic 
models that are ideal for all stakeholders.
As it can be seen from the mission statement and the main activities, the Hungarian 
Sharing Economy Association is a lobbying organisation aimed to promote the idea of 
sharing rather than a classical employer’s association, but this can change over time and 
might play a significant role especially by its shaping regulation activities.
Dominance of informal and grassroots initiatives in interest articulation
Irrespective of where they work, there are many references in the literature to factors 
relating to how difficult it is to organise labour working in these platforms. Akgüc et al. 
58 Source: https://veddberbe.hu/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
59 Source: https://dooroffice.hu/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
60 Source: https://kaptarbudapest.hu/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
61 Source: www.roomly.io/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
62 Source: https://business.melodiak.hu/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
63 Source: www.tickething.hu/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
64 Source: www.barion.com/hu/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
65 Source: https://rukkola.hu/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
66 Source: https://tokeportal.hu/ (Accessed: 22.05.2020.)
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(2018), for example, revealed a number of reasons why platform workers tend to refuse 
attempts from the side of trade unions to cover these workers:
1. A general declining trend in unionisation rate, as was described in the previous 
section.
2. Low wage earners tend to prefer to use time for executing another task rather than 
to attend meetings where they could be organised.
3. As platform work may involve very different tasks and activities, it is often not clear 
which sector platform workers belong to and therefore they are often uncertain which 
union would be most appropriate.
4. Platform workers carry out their tasks in a relatively individualised way and this 
isolated, atomised way of working does not favour organising workers for collective 
actions.
5. Platform work often involves short-term, temporary commitments, secondary jobs, 
while unionisation requires long-term common interests in one’s main job.
6. The tradition of collective action varies greatly across countries, as was extensively 
elaborated on in the first section.67
The same issues apply in the Hungarian context. One of our experts interviewed, however, 
indicated that there are in fact significant differences among platform workers accor-
ding to their type of jobs. Freelancers who carry out highly skilled jobs tend to regard 
themselves as self-entrepreneurs and in some cases view their experience as the first 
step in an evolution of learning how to become an entrepreneur. They build informal 
structures, in many cases by using online tools (chat rooms, forums, Facebook groups, 
etc.), to share some problems and offer solutions for them. The most important topics 
for these workers are the following:
1. Psychological problems like solitude.
2. Productivity: how to work effectively in a home working environment.
3. Attracting new clients: how to create brand, make new deals, promote their talent 
to stand out in the crowd.
4. Pricing: it is a crucial point in the freelancers’ work as in most of the cases there is 
no general scheme for pricing, each and every work is bargained individually.
5. Working conditions: how to ensure the best working conditions, opportunities and 
threats of flexible working arrangement, continuous training.
6. Employment status and problems related to taxation and accountancy.
In addition to the different online “communities of practices”, there are regular meet-ups, 
where these problems are discussed in person with the direction of experts of the field.
67 Akgüc et al. 2018, 6.
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Uber failure in Hungary: Unfair competition not tolerated by social actors68
Uber appeared in Hungary during the early 2010s and its business model became a hot 
topic automatically. There were two main concerns about their activities: first, Uber 
paid its company tax outside Hungary. Second, their business model was based on unfair 
competitive advantages. Uber claimed that they are not a taxi company but only a high-
tech firm and application developer through which they link customers and individual 
service providers who were (self-) entrepreneurs. Rival taxi companies, however, pro-
tested against them for several reasons:
1. Uber did not pay the obligatory deposit every other taxi company had to pay.
2. Uber did not have to comply with strict environmental requirements regarding fleets.
3. Uber did not have any obligations towards their quasi-employees and
4. The Uber drivers did not have to make the same exams and tests that every other 
taxi driver had to.
The main root of all of these issues was Uber’s business model and the fact that Uber 
refused to be acknowledged as a taxi company. Taxi drivers represent a traditionally 
strong interest group in Hungary and in this case, they found a powerful ally in the 
Hungarian Government because of the tax evasion. The taxi drivers’ trade unions organ-
ised demonstrations and petitions against Uber that was promoted by taxi drivers and 
taxi company owners. The Hungarian Trade Union for Taxi Drivers (Magyar Taxisok 
Szakszervezete) blocked Budapest in January 2016 with a demonstration that effectively 
shut down traffic in the city centre. Following this demonstration, the Hungarian Par-
liament adopted a new regulation, which practically prohibited providing services in 
a similar way to Uber, and on 13 July 2016, Uber announced they would leave Hungary. 
However, it is worthy of note that the employment status and the working conditions of 
the taxi drivers working for traditional taxi companies are rather similar to those working 
for Uber; therefore, the public debate around Uber focused mainly on unfair competition 
and tax avoidance, while deeper problems related to job quality, working conditions and 
employment status have been overshadowed. The destiny of Uber in Hungary was rather 
similar to the German case where “…Uber never got off the ground. The overarching 
taxi association mounted an immediate cease and desist order which framed Uber as 
a threat to the public interest and themselves as defender of the rule of law. The debates 
therefore moved quickly away from the public to the judicial arena”.69 There is, however, 
a similar company, originally called Taxify, renamed Bolt, that operates in Budapest 
and uses an app essentially identical to the one used by Uber for drivers and clients to 
connect and pay for rides electronically.
68 The authors would like to thank the significant contributions of Tibor Meszmann (research fellow and 
activist, Central European Labour Studies Institute [CELSI], Bratislava) that were an invaluable help in 
preparing the present report.
69 Thelen 2019, 3.
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Platform work and digitalisation of catalogues, records of public collections
The Hungarian public collections (libraries, museums, archives, etc.) usually have limited 
catalogues or inventory, and because the staff of these public institutions is limited in 
their ability to conduct digitalisation for these documents, small companies have been 
established to carry out digitisation tasks. These companies usually hire librarians and 
archivers, some of whom normally work in the public sector as civil servants, as part-
time workers or via self-employment. The Union of Cultural Institutions and Public 
Collections Employees (KKDSZ) considers these workers a target group (self-employed 
or part-time workers) but the organising of such a group is complicated. The KKDSZ will 
organise a conference in 2020 on the topic of digitalisation, they submitted an application 
for funding the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Budapest.
Platform workers versus entrepreneurs: The case of Airbnb70
There has been a steady growth in the accommodation services beginning in the late 1970s 
in Hungary, although this subsector is geographically concentrated around Budapest and 
Lake Balaton. The accession to the European Union in 2004 had an additional rise in 
the number of nights spent by international tourists in the country, and another wave has 
coincided with the emergence of Airbnb, which has proven to be a major disruptor of the 
lodging industry. Contrary to the case of Uber, the presence of Airbnb did not provoke 
any major social protests, mainly because of the much softer regulation: while Uber would 
have had to spend significant resources to meet all requirements resulting from the severe 
regulative environment, Airbnb has been completely free to operate. Thus, the company 
is not even registered in the country, running its daily operation through its two main 
European affiliates: Airbnb Ireland UC and Airbnb Payments UK Ltd.
According to some estimates, the number of apartments advertised through Airbnb 
is between seven and ten thousand. The Hungarian Hotel and Restaurant Association 
is the most powerful stakeholder on the employers’ side, and the association has been 
a vocal advocate against Airbnb since it entered onto the Hungarian market. Although 
the unionisation rate is extremely low in the sector (0.9%) it has a relatively well per-
forming social dialogue committee. The Association often invites foreign experts to 
these meetings, and several background papers have been elaborated under their super-
vision. Three of these expert documents deal exclusively with the impacts of platform 
economy71 on the sector: the first The emergence of sharing economy on the market 
of accommodation services was published in 2015, the second Analysis of experiences 
on renting private apartments as a commercial activity was published in 2016, and the 
third Demand and supply on the private apartments market between 2010–2017 came 
70 This section is based on Meszmann 2018 with some updates and complements.
71 They use the term sharing economy but we will refer to it as platform economy for the sake of consis-
tency.
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out in 2018.72 The Association considers Airbnb a strong competitor and attempts to 
lobby against it. Their arguments can be regrouped into three main streams: 1. unfair 
competition; 2. poor working conditions; and 3. reliance on foreign investors, who take 
profits outside of Hungary.
The first line consists of the well-known arguments on fair competition, the quality 
standards of the services and the taxation issues. As we mentioned earlier, Airbnb is 
not registered in Hungary and consequently it does not pay any taxes after the income 
generated in the country. In contrast, it is the owners of the apartments that would pay 
the taxes. While tax avoidance practices are not common in case of big real estate com-
panies who recognise the legal risks involved, this is not necessarily the case for the 
individual lessors.
A second group of arguments deals with the poor working conditions of employees 
working in the platform economy. This was a hot topic in 2017 during the sectoral social 
dialogue committee meetings: “The session of late 2017 covered the issue of platform 
economy in the accommodation sector, and in this session, the employers’ side posited 
that platforms indirectly threaten job security, quality of employment of workers in the 
traditional proxy sector, and created highly precarious, unregistered employment.”73 It 
is important to stress that this was the only example we found where the working con-
ditions of those engaged in the platform economy emerged as a key topic in the context 
of formal or institutionalised social dialogue.
A third group of arguments call attention to the wider negative impacts of short-term 
renting activities. As the market prices are lower in Budapest than in other European 
capitals, short-term renting proved to be a good investment for foreign investors, espe-
cially as the interest rates have been close to zero in the recent years. The appearance 
of Airbnb has led to an exponential growth of prices both for renting and for buying, 
and represents a major social risk for a growing number of people residing in Budapest, 
although the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on tourism and real estate has yet to 
be understood.
However, the majority of these arguments have not created much public interest so 
far, and the functioning of Airbnb can generally be regarded as smooth. The only social 
group that has been relatively successful when protesting against Airbnb have been the 
residents of inner districts of Budapest, where many young tourists rent apartments for 
a long week-end for partying, primarily young tourists who visit Budapest to celebrate 
bachelor days, birthdays and visit the ruin pubs. In this case, the debate is not around 
taxation or working conditions but rather on how to regulate this market in order to ensure 
the repose of residents of these central districts. (Budapest is not alone in having alco-
hol-fuelled, budget-airline-driven tourism cause disruptions in residential areas. Krakow, 
Prague and other destinations in Central Europe have experienced similar issues.)
72 The documents can be found on the following link www.hah.hu/elemzesek/sharing-economy.
73 Meszmann 2018, 24.
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It is also worth calling attention to the fact that this special group of apartment own-
ers differs greatly from all other types of platform workers in that they do not consider 
themselves platform workers. Other platform workers – be they micro-workers or highly 
skilled freelancers – also regard them as real estate investors and/or entrepreneurs who 
have nothing to do with “real” platform workers.
Concluding remarks
The analysis of the available quantitative and qualitative literature on platform work 
indicates that the online labour market has produced a visible growth since the global 
financial crisis and economic downturn (2008). The most recent survey on the use of 
platform work among internet users (COLLEEM database) shows that in such leading 
edge countries as Spain, Germany and Portugal, the estimated number of platform wor-
kers may exceed one-tenth of the adult population.74 In less active countries, such as 
Hungary, the share of occasional or regular platform workers is much lower, i.e. about 
7% of the adult population. However, it is also worth highlighting that the frequency of 
usage of platform works does not necessarily tell us much about its real role in terms of 
income generated by, or working hours spent on platform work. More detailed analyses 
suggest that this type of employment remains residual compared with the standard emp-
loyment form that are based on full-time working contracts on the offline labour market. 
Nonetheless, it is crucially important to regularly monitor the development trends in this 
field. At present, we lack reliable data from methodologically well-designed surveys 
that make cross-country comparisons and especially longitudinal analysis ponderous 
if not impossible.
The first step in this direction would be reaching a consensus on the definition of plat-
form work and a tentative typology to classify its most important forms. Currently there 
exists a plethora of definitions describing the wide variety of forms in this emerging and 
evolving sector of employment. The jobs differ greatly by several key factors: skill level 
required by the tasks or projects, length of time involved (which may range from passing 
keys to Airbnb clients to long-term contracts for software coding projects), as well as by 
the wages accessible for and the perceived social status of the workers. In addition, there 
are other features, such as online vs. physical presence that are being increasingly blurred 
as the coronavirus alters the workplace and more people are working online from home. 
What is common, however, in all types of platform jobs is the fact that the workers have 
a precarious employment status, being either self-employed or natural persons with some 
special legal and tax regulation. There is a vivid debate among labour law specialists on 
the question of whether it would be beneficial to create a special employment status for 
platform workers since platform companies deliberately avoid considering themselves 
employers of these workers. Such a special status would allow to clarify and “whiten” 
74 Pesole et al. 2019.
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this grey sector of the economy and allow platform workers to be paid a more equitable 
compensation for their level of social contributions.
Despite the lack of public debate on these issues, the employment status of the platform 
workers, their job content and their working conditions may raise serious concerns among 
not only social scientists but among trade unionists as well. A more detailed analysis of 
the national industrial relations system shows that the chances of the platform workers to 
be unionised or be represented by a trade union varies greatly according to country-spe-
cific institutional arrangement and culture of social dialogue. Platform workers are in an 
especially precarious situation in Hungary. Trade unions are generally weak, but their 
bargaining has been systemically further weakened since 2010. Instead of collective 
interest representation, individual bargaining has always been the prevailing form of 
solving workplace conflicts. In addition, the trade unions are also discredited for the 
majority of employees because of their compromised role in the state-socialist system 
and due to the dominance of the SMEs in the current employment landscape. Finally, 
the trade unions themselves tend to overlook platform work in part due to a lack of the 
necessary financial resources to organise, but primarily because it is extremely hard to 
organise this highly individualised, scattered group of workers.
Furthermore, we need more international comparative research on this topic. In addi-
tion to the COLLEEM project, which gathered quantitative information on platform 
workers, the only research project in Hungary that attempted to map the opportunities 
and threats of interest representation of platform workers has been the IRSDACE project. 
Labour law represents the only exemption, and labour law experts are relatively active 
in this field. Several PhD dissertations and higher level scientific papers have been 
recently made about how to regulate the precarious employment status of the platform 
workers. Perhaps not independently from the generally weak interest of social scientists 
in examining platform work in Hungary, the public debate is also virtually non-existent.
It is mainly the employers and their associations organised in the traditional segments 
of the same sector that are vocal about platform employment, focusing their complaints 
of how the companies and their workers are circumventing regulation, lessening quality 
standards and engaging in tax avoidance all of which result in unfair competition. The 
poor working conditions of platform workers were raised only in 2017 in the sectoral 
social dialogue committee of the hotel and tourism sector.
Although Uber and Airbnb have much in common in their business models, 
the appearances of the two global platforms in the Hungarian market have had 
completely different social impacts. This calls attention to the decisive role of such 
institutional filters, including the regulatory framework (being high in case of the 
local transport and low in case of accommodation), the professional identity of dif-
ferent socio-professional groups (strong in case of the local transport and weak in 
case of accommodation), and the sector-specific characteristics of sector level social 
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dialogue.75 One major research challenge is to better understand this filtering role 
of meso and macro level institutions in shaping the concrete country-specific local 
forms of such global practices as platform work. Another relevant research question 
is whether traditional forms of collective interest representation are suitable tools to 
organise such highly individualised workers, and if this is not the case, what are the 
more appropriate ways to ensure a minimum level of job quality and employment 
protection for the platform workers. Thirdly, it would be important to have reliable 
quantitative data on the spread of platform economy, in order to see to what extent 
it is interlinked with the changing demand of the offline labour market.
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